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The usual stereotype of Third World military regimes is ultracon-servatism combined with military force. In this environment the 
strength of the state dismantles organizations of popular expression, to 
restrain real wages, to hold down social reform and mass consumption 
in the interest of capital accumulation and upper-class income. 1 Based 
on this image, one would expect these countries' socioeconomic per-
formances to deviate significantly from that of civilian governments. 
Everything else being equal, conventional wisdom holds that Third World 
military regimes will have a higher defense burden (in terms of the 
percentage of GNP allocated to defense) and a larger share of the central 
government budget allocated to defense. Presumably these factors even-
tually cause the deterioration of socioeconomic performance. 2 
Surprisingly, quantitative studies have not identified significant dif-
ferences in socioeconomic performance between military and civilian 
regimes. In fact, a recent exhaustive study on the subject has concluded 
that "military control of the government has no discernible effect on 
our measure of welfare performance." 3 
The purpose of this research note is to examine the debate con-
cerning the military/civilian regime and socioeconomic performance from 
the perspective of comparative budgetary processes. Do budgetary pat-
terns differ between Third World military anq civilian governments? If 
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so, do military expenditures have a regime-distinctive impact on socio-
economic expenditures and therefore on the quality of life? Alterna-
tively, is poor socioeconomic performance in many Third World coun-
tries simply the result of abnormally high degrees of militarization 
irrespective of regime type? 
Our main finding is that a consistent set of socioeconomic differences 
exists between Third World military and civilian regimes. These differ-
ences result not only from differences in budgetary priorities, but almost 
as importantly from the manner in which governments mobilize re-
sources for military purposes. 
Research Design 
The decade up to 1982 is an appropriate period for analysis because 
it represents the culmination of almost a decade of expanded Third 
World military expenditures. 4 During this period, Third World govern-
ments increased allocations to the military through the use of oil rev-
enues and external borrowing. 5 
With regard to the definition of military/civilian regimes, Ruth Si-
vard provides an operational approach. 6 Of the 114 countries she clas-
sified as developing, 56 met one or more of the conditions considered 
sufficient for being classified as under military control: key political 
leadership by military officers, existence of a state of martial law, ex-
tra judicial authority exercised by security forces, lack of central political 
control over large sections of the country that are ruled by official or 
unofficial security forces, and control by foreign military forces. 7 
Unambiguous measures of the quality of life are difficult to derive. 
One standard approach, the physical quality of life index adopted by 
William Dixon and Bruce Moon in a related study has come under severe 
criticism in recent years. x This index is arbitrarily computed with equal 
weight given to its principal elements. 9 The same sort of problem exists 
in deriving a measure of the military burden. One often gets significantly 
different rankings of countries in terms of military spending, depending 
on whether one defines defense expenditures as a share of GNP, of per 
capita expenditures, or of central government budgetary expenditures. 
An objective solution to both problems is to create their respective 
indexes through the application of a maximum-likelihood factor anal-
ysis. 10 An additional advantage of this method is that it creates largely 
uncorrelated 11 measures of other relevant variables that can be used in 
further regression analysis. 
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Results 
Beginning with a data set of 59 countries (table 1) and 21 variables 
depicting various measures of socioeconomic development, economic 
performance, and military expenditures, 12 the factor analysis identified 
five major components (table 2): 13 
l. The first factor can be characterized as a general measure of the 
quality of life. It includes the literacy rate, life expectancy, and 
the like. 
2. The second factor depicts per capita income and the budgetary 
patterns associated with increases in this measure of develop-
ment. These involve increased public expenditures on health and 
education. 
Table 1 
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3. The third factor captures the main elements of economic per-
formance-the rates of growth in gross domestic product, in-
vestment and private consumption over the 1970-1981 period. 
4. The fourth factor depicts the degree of militarization. Here, mil-
itarization consists of the average military expenditure share of 
GNP, 14 the average military expenditure per capita, and the av-
erage share of defense in the central government budget. 
5. Finally, the fifth factor reflects the extent of external public debt 
accumulated by 1981. Because the debt crisis of 1982 ended a 
decade of rapid capital flows to the developing countries, this 
factor represents the bulk of that debt accumulation process. 
Table 2 
Oblique Rotated Factor Pattern 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factors 
Quality Social Military 
of Expendi- Expendi- External 
Variable Life tu re Growth tu re Debt 
Literacy rate 0.993 -0.18 -0.08 0.01 -0.06 
Life expectancy 0.903 -0.03 -O.Q7 0.02 -0.06 
% women in university 0.893 -0.13 0.07 0.14 0.01 
% school-age population in 
0.703 school 0.12 0.05 -0.11 0.12 
% population with safe water 0.463 ·0.20 0.00 0.01 0.09 
Population per hospital bed -0.35 -0.19 0.15 0.22 -0.15 
Population per physician -0.763 -0.21 -0.23 0.05 0.02 
Population per teacher -0.783 -0.28 -0.15 0.10 -0.05 
Infant mortality -0.953 0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.14 
Education expenditure -0.04 0.933 0.01 0.20 0.02 
GNP per capita 0.03 0.843 0.02 -0.02 -0.18 
Health expenditure 0.22 0.523 -0.18 0.02 -0.11 
Growth in GNP 0.19 -0.31 0.853 0.05 0.13 
Growth in investment -0.05 0.11 0.833 0.09 -0.12 
Growth in consumption -0.09 0.52 0.673 -0.04 -0.02 
Military expenditure per GNP -0.03 0.24 0.02 0.883 0.11 
Military expenditure per budget -0.12 -0.17 0.20 0.743 -0.17 
Military expenditure per 
population 0.17 0.48 -0.14 0.71 3 0.11 
Debt service per GDP 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.823 
Debt per GDP -0.09 -0.13 -0.10 0.14 0.71 3 
Debt service per exports 0.06 -0.09 0.03 -0.09 0.663 
Eigenvalue 8.47 3.56 2.03 1.73 1.22 
Proportion of variance 
explained 46.90 19.70 11.24 9.56 6.79 
Total variance explained 46.90 66.60 77.84 89.08 95.87 
3High Factor Loading 
Sources: Ruth Sivard. World Military and Social Expenditures (Washington, D. C.; World Priorities, 






Factor1 Social Military Factors 
Country Quality Expendi- Factor3 Expendi- External 
Grouping of Life tu re Growth tu re Debt 
Military Regimes -0.21 -0.29 -0.04 -0.03 -0.21 
Civilian Regimes 0.21 0.29 0.04 0.03 0.21 
Moderate Militarization 
(factor4>0) -0.07 -0.08 0.25 0.73 -0.24 
(factor4<0) 0.06 0.06 -0.18 -0.52 0.18 
High Militarization 
(factor4>0.25) -0.30 0.14 0.10 1.22 -0.12 
(factor4<0.25) 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.37 0.04 
Low Militarization 
(factor4> - 0.25) -0.13 -0.14 0.16 0.54 -0.27 
(factor4< - 0.25) 0.15 0.16 -0.18 -0.62 0.31 
Notes: Country factor scores are obtained from factor analysis presented in Table 1. Militarization 
groupings are based on countries above and below specified Factor4 (the military expenditure 
factor) scores. 
Since the oblique factor analysis generated relatively uncorrelated 
factors, 15 they were selected as variables for the regression analysis 
below. The factor scores16 (table 3) suggest that important differences 
exist between military and civilian regimes: military regimes score con-
sistently below their civilian counterparts on all five dimensions. The 
largest difference between regimes occurs in health and education ex-
penditures per capita (Factor2). Somewhat surprisingly, military and 
civilian regimes differ the least on the military-burden dimension (Factor4). 
A basis of comparison is provided by the factor means for several 
other groupings of countries, as shown in table 2. These groupings reflect 
simple arbitrary17 cut-offs of the factor scores on the military-expendi-
ture dimension (Factor4). High militarization (Factor4 country scores 
> 0.00) are associated with lower quality of life, depressed social ex-
penditures, and lower external debt (but with higher rates of growth). 
Very high levels of militarization (Factor4 country scores > 0.25) are, 
however, associated with above-average expenditures on social pro-
grams. At the same time these countries experience greatly depressed 
quality of life scores. • 
In terms of the impact of military expenditures in divergent regime 
environments, some distinct patterns are apparent18 (see table 4): 
• Increased militarization (as depicted by Factor4) in military re-
gimes is usually characterized by a deterioration in the general 
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quality of life (Factor!). It is also associated with reduced levels 
of social expenditures per capita (Factor2). 
• Civilian regimes, on the other hand, do not appear to 'suffer 
declines in the quality of life stemming from increased defense 
burdens. In fact, these regimes appear to increase social expen-
ditures per capita with increases in the defense burden. 
These results are not simply a reflection of the somewhat high levels 
Table 4 
Military Expenditures by Regime Type and the 
Quality of Life and Social Expenditures 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Military Regimes 
1. Factor1 = -0.51 Factor4 + 0.08 Factor2 
(-2.61) (-0.39) 
df = 29; F = 6.00; r2 = 0.307 
2. Factor1 = - 0.55 Factor4 + 0.31 Factor3 
(-3.71) (2.09) 
di = 29; F = 9.02; r2 = 0.401 
3. Factor1 = - 0.43 Factor4 + 0.29 Factors 
(-2.61) (1.74) 
di = 29; F = 8.05; r2 = 0.373 
4. Factor2 = - O .S7 Factor4 + O .01 Factor3 
( - 3.28) (0.01) 
df = 29; F = 7.S1; r2 = 0.357 
S. Factor2 = - O.S7 Factor4 + 0.01 Factors 
(-3.28) (0.01) 
di = 29; F = 6.46; r2 = 0.324 
Civilian Regimes 
6. Factor1 = 0.01 Factor4 + 0.23 Factor2 
(0.03) (1.09) 
df = 29; F = 0.79; r2 = O.OS 
7. Factor1 = 0.11 Factor4 - 0.17 Factor3 
(0.61) ( - 0.88) 
di = 29; F = O.S7; r2 = 0.04 
8. Factor1 = 0.12 Factor 4 - 0.06 Factors 
(0.62) ( - 0.29) 
df = 29; F = 0.22; r2 = 0.02 
9. Factor2 = 0.46 Factor4 + 0.2S Factor3 
(2.79) (1.49) 
df = 29; F = S.02; r2 = 0.271 
10. Factor2 = O.OS Factor4 - 0.32 Factors 
(3.11) (-2.00) 
df = 29; F = 6.17; r2 = 0.314 
Notes: Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates. ( ) = t statistic; df = degrees of 
freedom; F = F statistic; r2 = coefficient of determination. The factors are those identified 
in Tables 2 and 3. 
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of militarization experienced by military regimes. As noted above (table 
3), compared to their civilian counterparts, military regimes do not as 
a group have higher levels of military expenditures. In addition, the 
results obtained (table 4) by performing the same set of regressions on 
country groupings based on high and low levels of military expenditures 
(Factor4 country scores above and below zero) show (table 5) no real 
pattern between militarization and declines in the quality of life. 
More specifically, countries with somewhat high levels of militari-
Table 5 
Military Expenditures by Degree of Militarization and 
the Quality of Life and Social Expenditures 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
Relatively High Militarization (Factor4 Country Scores>0.00) 
1. Factor1 = -0.29 Factor4 + 0.48 Factor2 
(1.39) (2.30) 
df = 24; F = 2.75; r2 = 0.200 
2. Factor1 = - 0.05 Factor4 + 0.17 Factor3 
( - 0.23) (0. 78) 
df = 24; F = 0.39; r2 = 0.034 
3. Factor1 = -0.24 Factor4 + 0.37 Factor3 
(1.01) (1.70) 
df = 24;F = 1.55;r2 = 0.122 
4. Factor2 = 0.50 Factor4 + 0.33 Factor3 
(2. 72) (1.81) 
df = 24; F = 4.46; r2 = 0.288 
5. Factor2 = 0.51 Factor4 - 0.21 Factor5 
(2.49) ( -1.02) 
df = 24; F = 3.09; r2 = 0.219 
Relatively Low Militarization (Factor4 Country Scores < 0.00) 
6. Factor1 = 0.01 Factor4 + 0.14 Factor2 
(-1.30) (0.70) 
df = 34; F = 2.41; r2 = 0.131 
7. Factor1 = -0.34 Factor4 + 0.01 Factor3 
(- 2.03) (0.85) 
df = 34; F =2.14; r2 = 0.118 
8. Factor1 = -0.30 Factor4 + 0.15 Factor5 
( -1.78) (0.87) 
df = 34; F = 2.57; r2 = 0.138 
9. Factor2 = -0.55 Factor4 + 0.18 Factor3 
( - 3.83) (1.26) 
df = 34; F = 9.18; r2 = 0.365 
10. Factor2 = -0.63Factor4 - 0.19Factor5 
(-4.32) (-1.32) 
df = 34; F = 9.28; r2 = 0.367 
Notes: Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates. ( ) = t statistic; df = degrees 01 
freedom; F = F statistic; r2 = coefficient of determination. 
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zation (Factor4 scores > 0.00) show no statistically significant relation-
ship between their military burden and their general quality of life. 
Instead, these countries can find the resources not only to increase health 
and educational (social) expenditures per capita but also to increase 
their military expenditures as well. In contrast, countries with low levels 
of militarization (Factor4 scores < 0.00) experience lower levels of health 
and educational expenditures during periods of expanded allocation to 
the military. 
In part, these differences in defense and social expenditure patterns 
can be explained by the extent to which governments have relied on 
external public debt to finance their public budgets (table 6). External 
public debt does not appear to be associated with the budgetary patterns 
in civilian regimes. However, countries with high levels of militarization 
Table 6 
Impact of Military and Social Expenditures on 
External Public Debt 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
Military Regimes 
1. Factors = - 0.40 Factor4 + 0.01 Factor2 
( -1.89) (0.01) 
di = 29; F = 2.64; r2 = 0.164 
Civilian Regimes 
2. Factors = 0.31 Factor4 + 0.06 Factor2 
(1.S2) ( - 2.01) 
di = 29; F = 2.24; r2 = 0.142 
Moderate Militarization (Factor4 Country Scores > -0.2S) 
3. Factors = 0.41 Factor4 - 0.11 Factor2 
(2.13) (-O.S4) 
di= 31; F = 2.3S; r2 = 0.140 
Very Low Militarization (Factor4 Country Scores > - 0. 2S) 
4. Factors = -0.36 Factor4 - 0.40 Factor2 
(-1.S8) (-1.74) 
di = 27; F = 1.76; r2 = 0.123 
Relatively High Militarization (Factor4 Country Scores >0.00) 
5. Factors = 0.50 Factor4 - 0.21 Factor2 
(2.41) ( -1.02) 
df = 24; F = 2.90; r2 = 0.209 
Relatively Low Militarization (Factor4 Country Scores <0.00) 
6. Factors = -0.43 Factor4 - 0.27 Factor2 
(-1.30) (0.70) 
df = 34; F = 2.41; r2 = 0.131 
Notes: Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates. ( ) = t statistic; di = degrees of 
freedom; F = F statistic; r2 = coefficient of determination. The factors are those identified 
in tables 1 and 2. 
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(table 6, equation 5 versus equation 6) have had their external public 
debt expanded with increased levels of military expenditures (but not 
because of increased social expenditures). 
Interpretation of Findings 
The results for countries with a high degree of militarization and/ 
or civilian regimes are consistent with those found by Robert McKinlay. 
After analyzing time series data on Third World budgets, he concludes 
that military expenditures in the Third World seem to have considerable 
budgetary autonomy . 19 Governments appear to adopt a given level of 
military commitment largely independent of the budget. The budget is 
expanded as necessary to incorporate the level of commitment. Evi-
dently, if countries wish to commit themselves to higher levels of military 
expenditure, government budgetary deficits per se will not constrain this 
expansion. Because countries seem to adjust their budgets to accom-
modate the level of military expenditure, this form of expenditure does 
not seem detrimental to education or health expenditures. 
McKinlay's results do not appear to account fully for the manner 
in which governments allocate resources in countries with military re-
gimes and/or low levels of militarization. At least in military regimes, 
a more complex process appears to be present. In these countries, not 
only the budgetary patterns themselves but also the means in which the 
public sector mobilizes resources appear to influence the quality of life. 
One explanation for these differences in military/civilian govern-
ment budgetary behavior and associated impacts may stem from dissim-
ilarities recently identified in their respective rent-seeking behavior. 20 
Military regimes appear to be in somewhat better control of defense 
expenditures than are their civilian counterparts. Specifically, allocations 
to defense in these regimes do not produce such generally adverse eco-
nomic effects as lower rates of investment, higher growth in imports, 
declines in the productivity of investment, and high rates of inflation 
found in civilian regimes. While both military and civilian regimes ex-
perience rent-seeking behavior, different groups are favored in each 
regime type. with civilian regimes favoring urban consumers and military 
regimes favoring industrial groups. 
These two contrasting styles of economic management appear to 
produce different environments: defense iwxpenditures tend to have a 
positive general impact on growth in military regimes and perhaps a 
negative impact on growth in civilian regimes. While conjectural at this 
point, military regimes may, by shifting income from the agricultural 
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sector, be able to finance defense expenditures while preserving the 
income levels of key economic (higher-income) groups during periods 
of military buildup. Civilian regimes, having less control over rent-seek-
ing groups, do not appear able to combine rent-seeking activity and 
military expenditures in a manner conducive to overall growth. 
More specifically, the impact of military expenditures on socioec-
onomic welfare in the Third World may not relate to the budgetary 
priorities per se but instead to the manner in which governments mo-
bilize these resources. Military regimes and countries with low degrees 
of militarization appear less likely to mobilize additional resources for 
expanded military expenditure through foreign borrowing. In contrast 
to civilian governments having low degrees of militarization, military 
regimes appear capable of, and inclined toward, diverting resources to 
defense from lower-income groups. 
Implied in this analysis is a worsening income distribution associated 
with defense expenditures in military regimes. Civilian regimes appear 
to obtain a more equal distribution of income stemming from increased 
expenditures. The net result should be decreases in the general quality 
of life in military regimes. In contrast, civilian regimes may experience 
a neutral or positive impact. 
Conclusions 
In a recent study21 Miles Wolpin argues that over the past two 
decades disproportionately large allocations to the military have lowered 
the standard of living in the Third World: 
In the past two decades, developing countries have increased 
their share of world military spending considerably. If these 
resources, or even just some of them were to be diverted 
from the military sphere to welfare programs, economic de-
velopment and so on, there would be a considerable im-
provement in living standards for the mass of population. 
Wolpin goes on to argue that there is a positive relationship between 
the level of a regime's military spending and the degree of internal 
repression it inflicts. 
The results presented in tables 4, 5, and 6 are somewhat at odds 
with this image. For one thing, military regimes do not necessarily spend 
more on defense, and in fact they are likely to spend less. More im-
portant, it appears that a consistent set of socioeconomic differences 
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exists with regard to the impact of military expenditures. However, these 
differences tend to be more closely associated with differences in regime 
type than with differences in the level of militarization per se. 
This finding and the fact that military regimes (but not highly mil-
itarized countries in general) systematically reduce health and education 
expenditures with increased defense burdens suggest that the most pro-
ductive area for future research may be comparative military/civilian 
budgetary processes. Here an examination should include resource mo-
bilization as well as budgetary priorities. Further testing of potential 
affects of military expenditures on the socioeconomic environment ap-
pears to be a less fruitful area of research. 
In this regard, it appears that a potentially productive area of re-
search may be found in a closer examination of the process of rent 
creation in military regimes. 22 Tentative findings suggest that military 
regimes tend to finance increased levels of defense expenditures through 
the creation of rents for certain elite urban groups. 23 These rents come 
at the general expense of workers in the rural sector (thus accounting 
for the observed negative impact on socioeconomic development). 
In contrast, civilian regimes having less control over rent-seeking 
groups do not appear able to resort to income shifts to mobilize resources 
for increased allocation to the military. Instead, civilian regimes appear 
to be under pressure to increase allocations for both defense and socio-
economic programs. This process may result in the observed positive 
relationship between socioeconomic expenditures and defense. Given 
the inability of civilian regimes to mobilize resources for defense at the 
expense of any one major group, (particularly groups at the lower end 
of the income scale), the general impact of defense expenditures on 
socioeconomic development may be neutral. 
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